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I. INTRODUCTION

On September 11, 2001, a network of terrorists hijacked four commercial
airliners and crashed them into the World Trade Center and Pentagon, killing
and injuring thousands of Americans, as the world watched in shock and
disbelief.' In a perfect biblical setting, the government of the United States
would invoke the "eye for an eye" doctrine and retaliate with lethal force,
seeking justice for the thousands of men, women, and children that our country
lost in the blink of an eye. However, when the United States signed the United
Nations Charter on June 26, 1945, it became bound by international law and the
2
limits of warfare that accompany it.
I.
Frank Hyland, Terrorism Hits Home: Hundreds Feared Dead as Planes Hit World Trade
Center; Pentagon also Hit by Suicide Attack from the Air; All Airline Flights Nationwide are Canceled,
ATLANTA J.&CONST., Sept. 11,2001, at IA; Michael Grunwald, TerroristsHijack 4Airliners,Destroy World
Trade Center, Hit Pentagon; Hundreds Dead, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2001, at Al.
2.
U.N. CHARTER, pmbl., http://www.un.org/Overview/Charter/preamble.html. Provides that
"[a]ccordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco,
... have agreed to the present charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international
organization to be known as the United Nations."
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At the time the charter was ratified, the purpose of the United Nations was
to promote harmony and peace around the world and to save future generations
from the horrors of war.3 Although the United Nations and its charter have
signified a noble and important idealism, much debate has occurred over recent
years concerning the limitations of a state's right to defend itself. In the wake
of September 11, the argument more specifically involves whether a State can
invoke Article 51 of the United Nations Charter in the event of a terrorist attack
and subsequently attack the state that harbors those terrorists.' The United
States emphatically, and without hesitation, has responded to this issue.5
On October 7, 2001, the permanent representative of the United States sent
a letter to the United Nations, addressed to the President of the Security
Council, claiming the United States has an inherent right of individual and
collective self-defense, and reporting it had initiated actions designed to prevent
and deter further attacks on the United States.6 Since then, the United States has
taken direct military action in Afghanistan, leading and partnering with
governments from around the world to form a coalition whose purpose is to do
everything possible to eliminate the threat posed by international terrorism, and
to deter states form supporting, harboring, or acting complicity with
international terrorist groups.7

3.
Id. Provides that "[wie the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
for these needs to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security."
4.
U.N. CHARTER, art. 51, http://www.un.org/Overview/Charter/chapter7.html [hereinafter U.N.
CHARTER] (reference is made to a states inherent right to self defense and allows for a state to take measures
in the event of an armed attack).
5.
A Nation Challenged; Bush's Remarks on U.S Military Strikes in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
8, 2001, at B6. In a presidential announcement, President Bush announced "[o]n my orders the United States
military has begun strikes against Al Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan."
6.
Letter dated October 7, 2001, from the Permanent Representative of the United States of
America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess. at
1,U.N. Doc. S/2001/946 (2001), http://www.un.int/usa/s-2001-946.htm ("In accordance with Article 51 of
the Charter of the United Nations, I wish ...
to report that the United States of America ...
has initiated actions
in the exercise of its inherent right of individual and collective self-defense following the armed attacks that
were carried out against the United States."); See also Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of "Armed
Attack" in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 43 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 41,42 (2002). On the same day in which the
letter was sent, the United State and the United Kingdom launched cruise missiles and long-range bombers
against Al Qaeda and Taliban targets in Afghanistan" Id..; See Patrick E. Tyler, U.S. and Britain Strikes
Afghanistan, Aiming at Bases and Terrorist Camps: Bush Warns "Taliban Will Pay a Price," N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 8, 2001, at Al.
7.
Campaigning
Against
Terrorism:
A
Coalition
Update,
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/marchl l/coalition/military.html (Mar. 11,2002) ("To date, 17 nations have
deployed to the US Central Command's area of responsibility with over 16,500 troops.").
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This article will consist of two main parts. First, this paper will provide an
overview and breakdown of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, including
the settings and circumstances in which a state can invoke the article and
retaliate against another state in self-defense. Then, this paper will provide an
analysis of the United States war in Afghanistan, focusing on the war's legality
under the United Nations Charter and Article 51, in an objective format that will
provide both narrow and broad interpretations of the controversial legal
concepts embedded within Article 51.
II. THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND ARTICLE 51
When the United Nations Charter was signed following World War II, the
basic premise of the treaty was to outlaw war.8 This principal is inferred from
the general provisions of the Charter. Article 2(3) requires that all members are
to settle their disputes in a peaceful manner, 9 while Article 2(4) goes on to say
that all members, in their international relations, shall refrain from using force
against any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations.' ° According to the International Court of Justice, these provisions
regarding the restraint of force are not just United Nations Charter provisions,
but are now regarded as a rule of customary international law." Accordingly,
peace and tranquility have become the customary rule of international law with
few exceptions.12
Although peace and security was the ultimate objective of the United
Nations Charter, the framers still understood the long-established right of a state
to defend itself. 13 Therefore, as an exception to the general rules regarding the
Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620 (1984)
8.
[hereinafter Schachter].
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, http://www.un.org/Overview/Charter/chapterl.htm Provides that "[aill
9.
members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace
and security, and justice, are not endangered."
10.
Id. Provides that "[a]ll members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."
11. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
100 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicar v. U.S. ]; Jack M. Beard, America's New War on Terror: The Casefor SelfDefense under InternationalLaw, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 559 (Spring 2002) [herinafter Beard].
12. Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 11;. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE,72
(2nd ed.) (1994). -Distinguishing from the modem limits on warfare that accompany treaties and agreements,
Dinstein points out that the predominant conviction of the 19th and early 20th centuries was that every state
had a right to embark upon war whenever the state pleased. With all the discretion they need, states could
"resort to war for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all".; See also H.W. BRIGGS, THE LAW OF
NATIONS 976 (2nd ed, 1952).
13.
Nicar. V. U.S., supra note 11,at 94 ("On one essential point, this treaty itself refers to preexisting customary international law; this reference to customary law is contained in the actual text of Article
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use of force, the framers drew up Article 51.14 According to Article 51,
"Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self defense if an armed attack against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security...""
As international conflicts have grown prevalent in today's society, the text
of Article 51 has drawn much debate over how the Article should be interpreted
and, in particular, what circumstances must be present for a state to legally
defend itself.16 The inconsistency and incoherence surrounding Article 51 is
due primarily to the lack of definitions and references given to certain terms in
the text of the Article.' 7 For instance, before Article 51 can be invoked, there
must have been an "armed attack" on a nation.' 8 However, nowhere in the
provision does it say what constitutes an "armed attack". 9 Can an armed attack
be a terrorist attack? What about the assassination of a government leader?
Then there is the controversial issue as to what the framers of the article meant
by the expression "self-defense."2 What degree of self-defense is allowed?
Should the term "self-defense" be interpreted the same way that "self-defense"
is interpreted under certain state statutes? Under Florida law, the use of deadly
force would be justifiable if a person reasonable believes that such force is
necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm.2' Should the same
standards be used in the case of an attack on a country? Here lies the confusion
that surrounds Article 51 and scratches the head of legal scholars around the
globe.

51, which mentions the 'inherent right' of individual or collective self-defence."); Schachter, supra note 8, at
259-60.
14.

U.N. CHARTER, supra note 4.

15.
U.N. CHARTER, supra note 4. The article goes on to say that "[m]easures taken by Members in
the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not
in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under present Charter to take at any
time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."
16.
Micheal J. Glennon, The Fog ofLaw: Self Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51
of the United Nations Charter,25 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 539,540 (2002) [hereinafter Glennon] ("Between
1945 and 1999, two-thirds of the members of the United Nations - 126 states out of 189 - fought 291
interstate conflicts in which over 22 million people were killed.").
17.
U.N. CHARTER, supra note 4. There are no definitions in Article 51 to any of the broad terms
used in the charter.
18.
Id.
19.
Id.
20. Id.
21.
FLA. STAT. §.776.012 (2002) (Use of Force in Defense of Others).
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III. ARMED ATTACK
A. FramersIntent
The lack of authority as to what constitutes an "armed attack" has
promulgated a heated debate among legal scholars. There are many who believe
that it was the United Nations intent to apply a narrow definition to the term
"armed attack" under Article 5 1.22 Under such a view, the term "armed attack"
would not include attacks from terrorist organizations. 23 This rationale could
be reasoned to be accurate and consistent with traditional views considering, at
the time the charter was signed, military attacks, not terrorist attacks, occupied
the minds of world leaders.24 Furthermore, these same scholars have argued that
if it were the framers intent to apply a broad interpretation rather then a narrow
interpretation, then there would be no limitation as to whether an armed attack
has occurred. 25 An e-mail threat from abroad could be argued to constitute an
"armed attack" under such a broad view. However, a narrow interpretation
would allow many acts of war to easily take place without any legal resistance.
"Interpreting the concept of 'armed attack' restrictively, where the underlying
attack is terrorist in nature would merely serve to transform a necessary state
26
response into an 'unlawful' response under the United Nations Charter."
States that utilize terrorists to carry out acts of war on other nations would
essentially be protected under the United Nations Charter.2 The expression
"armed attack" should therefore be construed using a broad view, ensuring that
the September 11 attacks constituted an "armed attack" under Article 5 1.
B. Nicaraguav. United States of America
It also has been argued that a situation in which a country harbors a
terrorist organization does not come within the meaning of the term "armed
attack" as interpreted by the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua v.
United States of America.28 In this infamous case, Nicaragua had claimed that
22. Glennon, supra note 16, at 542.
23.
Id. Ian Brownlie, writing as early as 1963, opined that "sporadic operations by armed bands also
would seem to fall outside the concept of armed attack."
24.
Id. at 546 ("The intent of the Charter's framers was to make acceptable uses of force readily
distinguishable form unacceptable uses of force.").
25.
David Tumdorf, The U.S. Raid on Libya: A Forceful Response to Terrorism, 14 BROOK. J.
INT'L. L. 187, 218 (1988).
26.
Id.
27.
Id. ("Under a restrictive interpretation, states which sponsor terrorists are essentially permitted
to utilize surrogates to carry out acts which might otherwise lead to war had those acts been carried out
overtly.").
28.
Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 11.
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the United States had violated Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, "to
refrain from the threat or the use of force," by conducting military actions
against them. 29 The United States argued that Nicaragua had been providing
weapons and other support to rebels in order to help them overthrow the
government of El Salvador, and the fact that Nicaragua had provided these
weapons and support to the rebels was evidence of an "armed attack" against El
Salvador. 0 It was the court's opinion that the conduct of the United States
towards Nicaragua could not be justified by the right of collective self-defense
in response to an alleged armed attack on one of Nicaragua's neighbors. 3' The
court went on to say "while the concept of an armed attack includes the dispatch
by one State of armed bands into the territory of another State, the supply of
32
arms and other support to such bands cannot be equated with armed attack.
Although this type of activity may constitute a breach of Article 2(4) and the
principles of peace and international harmony, it is "of lesser gravity than an
armed attack."33 While this decision has been noted for setting a standard in
which the term "armed attack" is analyzed under Article 51, other
interpretations have recently emerged and been used to determine what
34
constitutes an "armed attack.
C. TerroristAttacks
When analyzing the expression "armed attack" from a literal standpoint,
terrorist acts taken out by armed bands with the support and encouragement of
a foreign state should be considered an "armed attack., 3' There is no language
in Article 51 that states an "armed attack" is limited to an attack by another
state. 6 This leads open the possibility that the article can be read broadly
enough to include the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.
"Armed attacks by non-State armed bands are still armed attacks, even if
commenced only from- and not by- another State."37 However, because a state

29.
Id. at 18.
30.
Id. at 126-27.
31.
Id.
32.
Id.
33.
Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 11, at 127.
34.
Mark M. Baker, Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-Defense (A Call to Amend Article 51
of the United Nations Charter), 10 Hous. J. INT'L. L. 25, 38-39 (1987) [hereinafter Baker].
35.
Baker, supra note 34, at 38-39; See also Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The
Strikes Against Bin Laden, 24 YALE. J. INT'L. L. 559, 563-564 (1999) ("There is nothing in the U.N. Charter
or international practice that restricts the identity of aggressors against whom states may respond - private
actors as well as governments may be the sources of catastrophic conduct.").
36.
Baker, supra note 34, at 41-42.
37.
See DINSTEIN, supra note 12 at 238. ("The crucial question is whether an armed attack actually
occurred. Thus, a hypothetical military action by the United States against drug traffickers in Columbia would
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responding in force to an isolated act of terror would undoubtedly be
condemned for its actions, other factors should also be considered before
responding to terrorism. 38 Yehuda Blum believes that factors such as the level
of state support given to the terrorists, and whether the attack was an isolated
terrorist act, are but one link in a long chain of acts that are relevant when
considering if a terrorist act rises to the level of an "armed attack."39
Furthermore, subjective factors such as the terrorist threat to a state's safety and
the motives of the state's government where the terrorists operate have been
noted as being issues that may be considered when trying to determine whether
an attack constitutes an "armed attack."'
When considering recent terrorist activity, it seems at first glance that the
September 11 attacks were isolated from other terrorist attacks by Al Qaeda and
should therefore not rise to the level of an "armed attack."'41 However, this is
simply not the case. The sheer magnitude of crashing a commercial airliner into
the world trade center, killing thousands of people, and causing massive
destruction to a nation's most symbolic city cannot be compared to sporadic and
minor isolated attacks.42 The September 11 attacks were not the first attacks on
American targets and, according to Al Qaeda leaders, they will probably not be
the last.43 Consequently, this makes many confident that the September 11
attacks represent an on-going pattern of behavior involving terrorist activity,
raising them to the level of an "armed attack" under Article 5 1.44 In addition,
the situation here is not one in which a terrorist organization overpowered a
weak non-supportive state government. The United Nations Security Council
not be justifiable as self-defence"); See J.R. Edmunds, Nonconsensual U.S. Military Action against the
Columbian Drug Lords under the U.N. Charter, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 129, 154 (1990).
38.
Baker, supra note 34, at 42.
39.
Id.; See Yehuda Blum, The Beirut Raid and the International Double Standard: A Reply to
ProfessorRichard A. Falk, 64 AM. J. INT'L. L. 80 (1970).
40.
Baker, supra note 34, at 43.
41.
Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., The Use ofArmed ForceAgainst Terrorism: American Hegemony or
Impotence?, I CHI. J. INT'L L. 37, 44 (2000). Osama Bin Laden has been either indicted or been linked to a
number of terrorist attacks against the United States, including the bombing of the United States embassies
in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the bombings of United States military facilities in Saudi Arabia in 1995 and
1996.
42.
Beard, supra note 11, at 574; Antonio Cassese, The InternationalCommunity's Legal Response
to Terrorism, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 589, 596 (1989).
43.
Beard, supra note 1I, at 587-588; Nora Boustany, Arab Newspapers Focus on Taliban's Fall,
WASH. POST., Nov. 16, 2001 at A38 ("The Taliban's leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, is quoted as saying
he had 'a grand plan to destroy America', which will begin shortly."); Responsibilityfor the Terrorist
Atrocities in the United States, 11 September 2001: Executive Summary, 10 DOWNING STREET NEWSROOM,
Nov. 14, 2001, at http://www.number-I0.gov.uk/output/page384.asp (Omar is also quoted in a videotaped
interview on al-Jazeera TV news broadcast saying "Here is America struck by God Almighty.. .I swear to God
that America will not live in peace before peace reigns in Palestine.").
44.
Beard, supra note 1I, at 575.
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has on many occasions expressed its concern and condemnation in regards to
the Taliban's support of Al Qaeda 5 For example, in resolution 1333, the
Security Council "condemned the Taliban Regime for its support of
international terrorism, deplored its continuing provision of a safe haven to
Osama Bin Laden and his associates, and demanded that the Taliban swiftly
close all terrorist training camps on its territories."46 Thus, the motives of the
Taliban government, and their strong ties with the Al Qaeda terrorist
organization, help support the belief that an "armed attack" occurred on
September 11, 2001.
D. InternationalSupport
Responses from international world organizations also support the notion
that the September 11 attacks signaled an "armed attack" against the United
States.47 According to a statement made by NATO Secretary General Lord
Robertson, the NATO parties had "determined that the attack against the U.S.
on September 1 th was directed from abroad and shall therefore be regarded as
an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty."4 Article 5 makes
direct reference to the term "armed attack" stating that an "armed attack against
one or more of them"... "shall be considered an attack against them all," and
that "if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the rights of
individual and collective self defence recognized by Article 51 of the charter of
the United Nations will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking
forthwith"... "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed
force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."49
Although nations from around the world have given their condolences and
support to the United States, the United Nations Security Council has yet to
declare that the September 11 attacks were an "armed attack" under Article 51.50
This could take to mean by many that the United Nations Security Council
believes that the September 11 attacks did not constitute an "armed attack" on
the United States and is allowing an illegal war to continue indefinitely.
However, this interpretation is not correct. The United Nations Security
45.
Id. at 583.
46.
Id.;SeeS.C. Res. 1333, U.N. SCOR., 55th Sess., 425 Ist
mtg.1 8, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1333 (2000).
47.
Beard, supra note II, at 568.
48.
NATO: Statement by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson (October 2, 2001),
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/sOl1002a.htm.
49.
North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1959, art. 5, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246,
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm.
50. Beard, supra note II, at 569; See also Actions Taken Around the World as Coalition Begins Air
Strikes in Afghanistan, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, Oct. 14, 2001, WL APWIRES File (The European
Union, Pacific Allies, and numerous states throughout Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia express their support
for the United States military response to the September 1Ithterrorist attacks).
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Council has issued two resolutions that reaffirm the United State's right to selfdefense.5' By reaffirming this right, the United Nations Security Council is
implying that there was an armed attack on the United States and therefore is
recognizing the United States's inherent right of self-defense.
IV. SELF-DEFENSE

A. The Caroline Case
Like other expressions and terms stated throughout article 51, the United
Nations Security Council makes no reference as to what constitutes reasonable
and proper self-defense under the charter. Due to this lack of authority,
deference has customarily been given to traditional international law when
determining what constitutes reasonable and proper self-defense. 2
International law and the concept of self-defense have been primarily
shaped by the infamous Caroline case, which occurred during the Canadian
rebellion of 1837. 53 In that case, a British officer, believing that an American
ship named the Caroline was operating as an ammunition supply vessel for
Canadian vessels, gave orders to destroy the ship when it was docked at Fort
Schlosser in New York. 4 Consequently, British soldiers boarded the ship,
assaulted the men on board, and set the ship on fire, killing two American that
were on board.55 While the United States condemned the attack as an illegal use
of force against the United States, British officials argued that the destruction
of the Caroline was legal and justified by the necessity of self-defense.56 In
response to the British contention that the incident was a justifiable act of selfdefense, United States Secretary of State Daniel Webster sent a letter addressed
to Henry Fox, the British Minister at Washington D.C. in which he defined the
51.
Beard, supra note 11, at 568; S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg. at I., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1368, 12 September 2001 ("recognizing the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence
in accordance with the charter"); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess. 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1373, 28 September 2001 ("reaffirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as
recognized by the Charter of the United Nations as reiterated in Resolution 1368 (2001).")
52.
Martin A. Rogoff & Edward Collins Jr., The Caroline Incident and the Development of
InternationalLaw, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 493, 504 (1990) [hereinafter Rogoff & Collins Jr.] ("The great
significance of the Caroline doctrine in modern international law results from a radical transformation of
norms relating to resort to force, and from an acceptance of Webster's formulation on resort to force in selfdefense as authoritative customary law.").
53.
Leah H. Campbell, Defending Against Terrorism: A Legal Analysis of the Decision to Strike
Sudan and Afghanistan, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1067, 1076 (2000) [hereinafter Campbell]; See Byard Q.
Clemmmons & Gary D. Brown, Rethinking InternationalSelf-Defense: The UnitedNations Emerging Rule,
45 NAVAL L. REV. 217, 220 (1998).

54.
55.
56.

Campbell, supra note 52, at 1077.
Id.
Rogoff & Collins Jr., supra note 51 at 496.

466

ILSA Journalof International& ComparativeLaw [Vol. 9:457

circumstances and conditions upon which a state can properly use force in selfdefense." In his letter, Webster stated that in order for the British to exercise
self-defense, the British government would have to show a necessity of selfdefense which is "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no
moment for deliberation."58 In addition, Webster also defined proportionality
as actions that are not unreasonable or excessive.59 British official Lord
Ashburton later agreed with the limitations on self-defense that Webster
outlined in his letter. 60 As a result, this case essentially gave rise to the law of
self-defense.6'
It is now accepted that self-defense is permissible only if the use of force
meets the elements of necessity and proportionality. 6 The use of force by one
state against another satisfies the element of necessity only if it can be shown
that there was no other alternative means by which to remedy the situation.63
The condition of proportionality is met if the use of force in self-defense does
not exceed the severity of the attack that triggered the use of force in the first
place. 4
B. Necessity
There are some scholars who believe that the United States has not met its
burden of proof with regards to the element of necessity, as recognized under
the Caroline doctrine, customary international law, and ultimately under Article
51 of the United Nations Charter. First, these commentators have argued that
the doctrine of necessity requires "immediacy" or a close-in-time response to
the original attack that precipitated the use of force.65 This could be inferred
57.
Id. at 497.
Id. at 497-98.
58.
59.
Sage R. Knauft, Proposed Guidelines for Measuring the Propriety of Armed State Responses
to TerroristAttacks, 19 HASTINGS INT'L. & COMP. L. REV. 763, 774 (1996) [hereinafter Knauft]; Robert J.
Beck & Anthony C. Arend, Don't Tread on Us: InternationalLaw andForcible State Responses to Terrorism,
12 WIS. INT'L. L.J. 153, 193 (1994).
Rogoff & Collins Jr., supra note 51, at 498.
60.
61.
Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 11,at 103. The international court of justice specifically recognized
necessity and proportionality as elements of self-defense under customary international law. According to the
courts opinion, "[slince the existence of the right of collective self-defense is established in customary
international law, the Court must define the specific conditions which may have to be met for its exercise, in
addition to the conditions of necessity and proportionality to which the Parties have referred."
62.
Rogoff & Collins Jr., supra note 51, at 498.
63.
Id.
Id.
64.
Beard, supra note II at 585; Francis A Boyle, Military Responses to Terrorism, 81 AM. SOC'Y
65.
INT'L L. PROC. 288, 294 (1987) ("This provision of the Charter [Article 51] made it quite clear that selfdefense could only be exercised in the event of an actual or perhaps at least imminent 'armed attack' against
the state itself."); Baker, supra note 34, at 34 (arguing that the "temporal element" of the requirement of
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from the expression used in Webster's letter where he states that necessity
occurs when there is "no moment of deliberation."66 Without such a need for
immediacy, it would be very easy for States to use the doctrine of self-defense
as a vehicle to retaliate for prior acts of violence and conquest.67 However, this
restrictive view, which requires an immediate threat, presents a problem in
modem warfare. When the Caroline doctrine was formulated in 1837, acts of
aggression took place on a larger scale with customary procedures that allowed
enemies to have the knowledge and time to prepare for battles. 68 Today's
landscape regarding warfare is quite different. Present day weapons such as
nuclear bombs and computer missile systems may not give a state time to
determine whether an attack is imminent. 69 Therefore, such a restrictive view
might eliminate any chance for justifiable self-defensive measures.7 °
As the problem of "immediacy" persists, there are many scholars who
argue that the right of anticipatory self-defense exists in Article 51 on the
premise that pre-charter rights inherently survive the adoption of the charter if
they are not prohibited by or inconsistent with it.7 According to this liberal
view, "because anticipatory action taken in defense of a state's territory" ...
"does not by definition involve a threat or use of force against" ... "another
state, and it is not inconsistent with the overarching purpose of the United
Nations to maintain international peace and security, it is permissible under
Article 51.',72
It appears to be more reasonable that the right to self-defense is not limited
to instances of actual attacks against the victim state, but rather extended to

necessity means that a response must be made close in time to the actual attack.").
66.
Rogoff & Collins Jr., supra note 51, at 497-98.
67.
Gregory Francis Intoccia, American Bombing of Libya: An InternationalLegal Analysis, 19
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L. L. 177, 202 (1987) [hereinafter Intoccia].
68.
Knauft, supra note 58, at 777. "Given the ongoing nature of many terrorist attacks, the
circumstances are vastly different than a singular incident along the U.S.-Canadian border in 1837".; William
O'Brien, Reprisals, Deterrence,and Self-Defense in Counter-TerrorOperations,30 VA. J. INT'L. L. 421, 471

(1990); See also Baker, supra note 34, at 34. Aarguing for a more realistic view of necessity and
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anticipatory responses to such attacks as well." Such a view would seem to be
more appropriate when considering the present day weapons of mass
destruction, which essentially phase out the distinction between actual and
imminent attacks.74 The United States certainly agrees with this position. In a
statement to the nation, President Bush announced that new threats to the United
States have required the Untied States to adopt a new policy of pre-emptive
actions, breaking from doctrines that have governed US foreign and military
policy for more than 50 years.75 Keeping with this new policy, the United States
response to the September 11 attacks was made nearly a month after the
September 11 attacks took place.76
Under the restrictionist view, this response clearly did not meet the element
of necessity, as the counterattack did not occur until weeks after four planes
were hijacked and propelled into the World Trade Center and Pentagon.77
However, there are many in the international community who are rethinking the
need of "immediacy" as an element of necessity. When the United States
invoked anticipatory self-defense to justify missile attacks against Sudan and
Afghanistan in 1998, the majority of the international community gave little
opposition to the preemptive use of force.78 This emerging thought seems to
allow for more responsible military actions. By not "jumping to the gun" and
waiting, a state would have time to gather all the information and intelligence
needed to prepare a well-thought-out military campaign against the "true"
opposition that is responsible for the attacks.
Although there has been a shift from a restrictionist view to a more liberal
view by many in the international community, significant challenges have still
been made concerning the legality of the United States military strikes in
Afghanistan and ultimately on the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense. In
response to these challenges, the United States has argued that the September
11 attacks were not isolated attacks but rather part of an on-going terrorist attack
by Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders.79 This could be easily proved by the
intelligence organizations in numerous states having produced significant
evidence that Al Qaeda cells around the world have continued and will continue
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to plan future attacks against the United States.8 ° Consequently, these realistic
and serious threats made against the United States must allow for the use of
preemptive force to defend against future tragedies.
C. Proportionality
Assuming the element of necessity is met, the use of force in response to
an "armed attack" still must be proportionate to the original attack.8' If taken
literally, this would mean that it would be perfectly legal to bomb the most
populous city in Afghanistan with the purpose of killing thousands of innocent
civilians. This, of course, is not the way in which proportionality should be
interpreted. Today, proportionality refers more to the balance between a
military objective and its cost in terms of lives lost or the military actions
needed to control the enemy. 2 The international community will only usually
condemn defensive military actions if the actions were overly excessive as
compared to the original attack in terms of civilian casualties or scale of
weaponry."
There are many opponents of the war who believe that the United States
military strikes in Afghanistan have not met the element of proportionality as
required by customary international law. Strong speculation has been
circulating among many scholars that the strikes against Afghanistan are not
military in nature, but rather political, with the intent to remove the Taliban
from power and establish a new government in Afghanistan.' Assuming this
proclamation has merit, the Taliban is not simply an army but a political entity,
and its members are largely civilians, not military combatants.8 5 Therefore,
many of the targets hit, such as the Taliban headquarters and other buildings in
Kabul and Kanda-har, would probably qualify as civilian targets.8 6 Reports
from the media that targets in Afghanistan have included airports,
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communication facilities, electrical plants, and government buildings, has added
to the speculation of excessive civilian casualties.87 Additionally, many Afghan
civilians have reported that the United States military has not been bombing just
military targets, but rather, residential neighborhoods.88 If these proclamations
have merit, then the United States bombings in Afghanistan could essentially
be considered to be overly excessive in terms of civilian casualties.
On the other hand, the United States government strongly denies that its
military targets Afghan civilians.89 Rather, it has been argued by United States
officials that all military strikes taken in Afghanistan have been strategic.9"
According to Col. Ray Shepard, "we painstakingly assess the potential for
injuring civilians or damaging injuring civilians, and positively identify targets
before striking."'" However, the United States has undoubtedly made mistakes.
An on-site review conducted by the New York Times has revealed that over
four hundred civilians have been killed in eleven locations where there have be
United States led air strikes. 9 These mistakes evidently have come from
mistaken information given by local Afghans and reluctance by the United
States to commit itself to a much riskier ground attack.9
Whether the United States has been using excessive force in its war on
terror is clearly subjective in its analysis. Although it can be argued that the loss
of hundreds of Afghan civilians outweigh any legitimate military objective of
the United States, it can be just as effectively argued that civilian casualties are
casualties of war and, although tragic, cannot possibly measure up to the lives
that will be saved by the United States military strikes. Either way, the United
States has recognized the need to reduce civilian casualties caused by bombing
mistakes. The United States military strategy has evolved away from the use of
air strikes as the primary weapon and more to the use of ground forces.94 This
trend will likely result in fewer innocent civilians being killed; thus, reiterating
87.
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the use of military force that is proportionate to the United States objective of
eliminating international terrorism.
IV. CONCLUSION

Today, the increasing emergence of transnational terrorism has changed the
way in which international law is used and interpreted. The threat of
unimaginable attacks, such as the one witnessed by the world on September 11,
2001, has promulgated the need for a broad view of Article 51 and the
circumstances in which a state may use force to defend itself from future
attacks. The framer's intent when drafting the United Nations Charter, although
primarily to promote peace and restrain rampant exercises of power, also
included the longstanding notion that a state inherently has the right to defend
itself when under attack by another state. That being said, the United States has
been the target of ongoing and consistent attacks by a state sponsored terrorist
organization, determined to continue in its efforts to destroy the United States.
Therefore, the United States must be able to legally defend itself as an
independent sovereign state.
There are many who say that Article 51 does not apply to terrorist attacks.
However, this view has become outdated and obsolete due to the modem threats
of warfare that face the international community. Terrorism has become a
vehicle for states to wage war against their enemies and, as such, states must be
given the authority to use state sponsored force to deter such attacks.
Otherwise, states that allow or use terrorism as a mechanism to accomplish
military goals will become easily shielded under the United Nations Charter
although essentially violating international law in the first place.
This view does not mean to say that all international terrorist attacks are
severe enough to invoke Article 51. Factors such as the severity of the attack,
the amount of state involvement with the terrorist attack or terrorist
organization, and the capability of repetition all should be seriously considered
when assessing whether a terrorist attack rises to the level of an "armed attack"
under Article 51. Taking these factors into consideration, the evidence is clear
that the terrorist attacks on September 11 were armed attacks under Article 51.
The evolution of modem weapons and nature of terrorism warfare also
stresses the need for anticipatory self-defense under Article 51. However,
before a state can attack another state, there should be undeniable evidence that
leads to the conclusion that an attack is needed to protect that state. Otherwise,
states would be able to invoke Article 51 and claim anticipatory self-defense
even though the attack was clearly retaliatory. The United States certainly had
evidence that Al Qaeda carried out the attacks on September 11 and had plans
of continual attacks on the United States. Therefore, the United States military

472

ILSA Journalof International& ComparativeLaw [Vol. 9:457

actions following September 11 were warranted to prevent future attacks on the
United States.
Lastly, the United States has been strategic in its application of military
operations, making it a point to assess civilian casualty. Even though mistakes
have been made, as in any war, the United States has made it a mission to
reduce civilian casualties by changing strategies. As such, the United States
attacks have not been overly excessive and disproportionate when compared to
its ultimate objectives.
The United Nations needs to understand that a new type of war has
developed and, consequently, must provide new flexible guidelines for the legal
invocation of Article 51 in the aftermath of a terrorist attack. Until that time
comes, forcible state responses, such as those actions taken by the United States,
need to be considered legitimate under a broad interpretation of Article 51.

